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ABSTRACT
We introduce the problem of aggregating the individual goals of a 
group of agents to !nd a collective decision. Goals are represented 
by propositional formulas on a !nite set of binary issues. We de!ne 
some rules for carrying out the aggregation of goals and we show 
how to adapt axiomatic properties from the literature on Social 
Choice Theory to this setting. The type of problems we are inter-
ested in studying for our rules are axiomatic characterizations, as 
well as the computational complexity of computing the outcome.
KEYWORDS
Social Choice Theory; Judgment Aggregation; Preference Repre-
sentation; Computational Complexity
1 INTRODUCTION
Social choice theory can be used in contexts where agents need 
to take collective decisions over a combinatorial space of alterna-
tives [3, 23, 24]. Thus, many researchers have introduced compact 
languages for preference representation [5, 15, 22] to be used as 
input for procedures finding a collective choice (see, e.g., the survey 
by Lang and Xia [18]).
In particular, in judgment aggregation [9, 12] agents use an ag-
gregation procedure to take a decision over a set of binary issues, 
based on their individual opinions. Numerous aggregators have 
been proposed in the literature to tackle the problem of obtaining 
a collective outcome that is consistent with a given integrity con-
straint (see, e.g., [10, 16, 20]). Applications of judgment aggregation 
have been found in multi-agent argumentation [1, 4] and in the 
collective annotation of linguistic corpora [21].
However, since agents are asked to give complete opinions over 
the issues, there are limitations on what they can express. For 
instance, if some agent wishes to express that they want to accept 
exactly one out of three issues, they would be forced to choose 
between submitting either ballot (100), (010) or (001), thus not fully 
representing their original more complex opinion.
In the model we propose here, agents can express their individual
goals as propositional formulas and then an option is collectively
chosen. Propositional goals are a compact way to represent dichoto-
mous preferences over alternatives described by binary variables.
Social choice with dichotomous preferences has been widely stud-
ied as a possible solution to the computational barriers a"ecting
classical preference aggregation (see, e.g., the survey by Elkind et al.
[8]). However, to the best of our knowledge, it has not been applied
to combinatorial domains such as those of goal aggregation.
We de!ne goal aggregation rules inspired from the literature in
judgment aggregation [7] and logic-based belief merging [13, 14].
Since in the literature on social choice theory aggregation rules are
typically studied with the axiomatic method, we de!ne an initial
set of axioms that will serve to study characterization results for
our rules. From a computational perspective, we want to study
the chosen rules by determining the complexity of computing the
outcome, a problem known in the literature aswinner determination.
We provide a characterization for one of the generalizations of
issue-wise majority rule, and we establish complexity bounds for
determining the outcome for some of our rules.
2 FRAMEWORK
A set N = {1, . . . ,n} of agents has to take a collective decision
over a set of propositional variables I = {1, . . . ,m} representing
the issues at stake. The individual goal γi of agent i is a consistent
propositional formula of language LI over the atoms in I and
closed under standard propositional connectives. An interpretation
is a function v : I → {0, 1} associating to each variable a binary
value. We also interpretv as the binary vector (v(1), . . . ,v(m)). The
set Mod(φ) = {v | v |= φ} consists of all the models of formula φ.
We let vi (j) = (m
1
i j ,m
0
i j
) indicate all the choices of agent i for
issue j in the di"erent models of her goal, where mx
i j
= |{v ∈
Mod(γi ) | v(j) = x}| for x ∈ {0, 1}. The issues on which the
agents have to take a decision are logically independent from one
another (i.e., we assume no integrity constraints). By collecting
for each agent i her individual goal γi we obtain a goal-pro"le Γ =
(γ1, . . . ,γn ). A goal-based voting rule F : (LI )
n → P({0, 1}m ) \ ∅
is a function taking as input n consistent goal formulas submitted
by the agents and returning a set of models as a collective outcome.
In case the output set is not a singleton we call the rule irresolute.
For resolute rules, we indicate with F (Γ)j = {1} (respectively, {0})
the acceptance (respectively, rejection) of issue j ∈ I by rule F .
2.1 Aggregation Rules
The conjunction rules return all the models in common among the
individual goals, and a chosen default model if there are none.
Conjv (Γ) =
{
Mod(γ1 ∧ · · · ∧ γn ) if non-empty
{v} for v ∈ {0, 1}m otherwise
The threshold rules are comparable to quota rules in judgment
aggregation [7]. Let µφ : Mod(φ) → R be a function associating to
each model v of φ some weight µφ (v). Then:
TrShµ (Γ)j = {1} i#
( ∑
i ∈N
(wi ·
∑
v ∈Mod(γi )
v(j) · µγi (v))
)
≥ qj
such that 0 ≤ qj ≤ n + 1 for all j ∈ I is the quota of issue j,
where for each v ∈ Mod(γi ) we have µγi (v) , 0 and wi ∈ [0, 1] is
the individual weight of agent i . For readability, we omit vector
(q1, . . . ,qm ), with the quotas for the issues, from the name of TrSh
µ .
We call E!ota rule the TrShµ rules having µγi (v) =
1
|Mod(γi ) |
andwi = 1 for allv ∈ Mod(γi ) and i ∈ N . Since
∑
v ∈Mod(γi ) µγi (v) =
1 for all i ∈ N , the number of models of a goal formula is irrelevant
and agents have an equal impact on the outcome.
Finally, we introduce three alternative de!nitions of the majority
rule. The !rst one is the EMaj (resolute) rule, which is an E!ota
rule having qj = ⌈
n
2
⌉ for all j ∈ I. The second version of majority
is irresolute and it compares for each issue the number of accep-
tances with the number of rejections, weighting each model of an
individual goal in the same way as in E!ota rules:
TrueMaj(Γ) = Πj ∈IM(Γ)j
where for all j ∈ I
M(Γ)j =
{
{x} if
∑
i ∈N
mxi j
|Mod(γi ) |
>
∑
i ∈N
m1−xi j
|Mod(γi ) |
{0, 1} otherwise
Thus, for each issue j ∈ I we compute the value ofM(Γ)j by setting
it to {1} (respectively, {0}) if strictly more than half of the agents
accept (respectively, reject) issue j, and to {0, 1} if exactly half
of the agents accept/reject. The third version of majority is 2sMaj,
de!ned asMaj(Maj(γ1), . . . ,Maj(γn )), where the strict majority rule
is applied !rst to the models of each individual goal and then again
to the result obtained in the !rst step.
3 AXIOMATIC CHARACTERIZATION
The axiomatic method in social choice theory evaluates aggregation
rules by !rst de!ning some general properties (axioms) and then
proving whether or not aggregation rules satisfy them. We de!ne
adaptations of known axioms for rules aggregating goals.
(A) An anonymous aggregation rule F is such that for any pro-
!le Γ and any permutation σ : N → N , we have that
F (γ1, . . . ,γn ) = F (γσ (1), . . . ,γσ (n)).
(I) An independent aggregation rule F is such that for any two
pro!les Γ and Γ′, for all j ∈ I and for all i ∈ N , we have
that vi (j) = v
′
i (j) implies F (Γ)j = F (Γ
′)j .
(N) A neutral aggregation rule F is such that for all pro!les Γ,
for all two issues j,k ∈ I, and for all agents i ∈ N we have
that vi (j) = vi (k) implies F (Γ)j = F (Γ)k .
(U) A unanimous aggregation rule F is such that for all pro!les Γ
and for all j ∈ I, ifmx
i j
= 0 for all i ∈ N then F (Γ)j = {1−x}.
(PR) Pro!les Γ and Γ′ are comparable if and only if for all i ∈ N
we have that |Mod(γi )| = |Mod(γ
′
i )|. An aggregation rule
satis!es positive responsiveness if for all comparable pro!les
Γ and Γ′ = (γ1, . . . ,γ
′
i , . . . , γn ), for all issues j ∈ I and for
all i ∈ N , ifm
′x
i j
≥ mx
i j
for x ∈ {0, 1}, then [F (Γ)j = {x} or
F (Γ)j = {0, 1}] implies F (Γ
′)j = {x}.
(E) An aggregation rule F is egalitarian if and only if for all pro-
!les Γ, if we construct a pro!le Γ′with |N ′ | = lcm(|Mod(γ1)|,
. . . , |Mod(γn )|), and for all i ∈ N and each v ∈ Mod(γi )
we have
|N′ |
|N | · |Mod(γi ) |
agents in N ′ voting v in Γ′, then
F (Γ) = F (Γ′).
(D) An aggregation rule satis!es duality when for all pro!les Γ
and for all issues j ∈ I, if F (Γ)j = {x} then F (Γ)j = {1 − x},
where Γ is such that vi (j) = (m
1
i j
,m0
i j
) = (m0
i j
,m1i j ) for all
j ∈ I and i ∈ N .
Following the seminal result of May [19], where an axiomatiza-
tion of the majority rule in the context of voting over two alterna-
tives is provided, we also axiomatically characterize TrueMaj, the
most intuitive among our proposed generalizations of majority.
Theorem 3.1. For arbitrary N and I, a goal-aggregation rule
satis"es (E), (I), (A), (N), (PR), (U) and (D) if and only if it is TrueMaj.
4 COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
The winner determination problem asks how hard it is to compute
the outcome of aggregation rules [2, 6, 11, 17]. For resolute rules
we de!ne it as follows (and analogously for irresolute rules):
WinDet(F )
Input: pro!le Γ, issue j
Question: Is it the case that F (Γ)j = {1}?
For a special case of TrShµ we get completeness for the class np.
Theorem 4.1. WinDet(TrShµ ) is np-complete, for µγi (v) = 1
constant andwi = 1 for all i ∈ N .
Let pp be the complexity class Probabilistic Polynomial Time.
Let TrueMaj∗ be a resolute version of TrueMaj that in case of equal
support for issue j returns 0 in the outcome.
Theorem 4.2. ProblemsWinDet(EMaj),WinDet(TrueMaj∗) and
WinDet(2sMaj) are pp-hard.
Since Γ contains formulas, if a rule has to manipulate the models
to compute the outcome some form of satis!ability is needed — thus
starting from the complexity class np. Asking agents to provide the
models of their goals would lower the complexity of some results,
but the input would become demanding for the agents and also of
exponential size in the number of issues in the worst case.
5 CONCLUSIONS
We presented a framework to handle the aggregation of individual
goals in a multi-agent setting. We de!ned a number of procedures
taking as input the consistent goal formulas of the agents and
returning a collective decision in the form of a set of valuations
for the issues at stake. We introduced three alternative de!nitions
of the majority rule and characterized one of them axiomatically.
We also studied computationally the problem of determining the
outcome for some of our proposed rules.
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